The triple shadow of China, Japan, and North Korea hangs over ROK-US relations. In ideal circumstances for the alliance, all of these sources darkening the horizon will blow away. In 2010-2012, they were all aligned nearly ideally for the alliance to prosper. North Korea was at its belligerent extreme. China showed little interest in appealing to South Korea. Moreover, until late in 2012 Japan-ROK relations were on the upswing. Talk of raising the alliance with the United States to a new level gained support in Seoul, as in Washington, but just holding onto what has been achieved is challenging in the new circumstances of more nuanced Xi Jinping regional policies, more divisive policies by a triumphant Abe Shinzo, and further uncertainty about the next moves of Kim Jong-un, three leaders who may have as much impact on the alliance as Park Geun-hye and Barack Obama in the coming few years.

Choi Kang recognizes the more complex environment in which the alliance functions in 2013, pointing to that as a reason for forging the “strategic alliance,” as agreed in 2009. Yet, the complexities observed today are quite far removed from those just a few years back. In pursuing “trustpolitik” with Pyongyang and Beijing and rejecting Tokyo for its recent rhetoric, Park is acting in ways that deepen these complexities.

One task that is proposed for strengthening the alliance is a more robust exchange of views. If differences over China are minor and some happy median is within reach after further exchange, then this advice is well taken. Yet, if China’s goal is to weaken the alliance, in line with criticisms found in many Chinese publications that this is a negative holdover based on “Cold War” mentality, then the problem will prove more difficult, as South Koreans may play into China’s strategy. At the Asan Washington Forum many comments on the Sino-US-ROK triangle warned of this complication.

A second task before officials of the two allies is to agree on a vision for the alliance, but this is not easy in the face of uncertainty about North Korea. After all, there is still no purpose for this alliance greater than deflecting the threat posed by North Korea. Yet, in 2001-2008 disagreement on how to deal with North Korea shook the alliance more than anything else. If Pyongyang remains in a belligerent mode, as it has been in 2009-2013, or if it shifts to a cooperative mode emphasizing economic development and peace, then proceeding to develop a shared vision would seem to be within reach. However, if the threat perceptions to the two allies diverge sharply and South Korea switches to a mixed strategy leaving its intentions uncertain, what would be the common vision? In the second part of the synopsis of the June 24-25 forum, issues involving the ROK-US-North Korea triangle will be further discussed.

A third task noted by Choi Kang is developing an action plan for a regional security architecture. With Washington urging Abe on as he expands Japan’s defense role and Seoul warning against his policies as if they will bring a rebirth of militarism, what kind of regional approach is possible? Differences in evaluating Japan were unmistakable at the Asan Washington Forum. Some consider this triangle the most important building block for regional security. In discussing regionalism, Japan has been prone to minimize South Korea’s significance. In considering how to manage North Korea, South Koreans now often leave Japan on the periphery. Focusing only on bilateral alliance matters when examining an action plan for regional security is a recipe for failure. Tightening Japan-US military cooperation must be a starting point.

As Choi Kang points out, the US-South Korean alliance has turned 60. The pact has been a great success, shielding the ROK as it developed. That objective has been achieved. We must recognize that the world today is a lot different than it was six decades ago. The world has changed, so should the alliance.

After the Korean War ended in an inconclusive armistice, Washington offered a “mutual defense” treaty to guarantee the security of the war-ravaged ROK. In those early years only the US promise to intervene, backed by a troop tripwire, prevented Pyongyang from renewing its attempt to conquer the entire peninsula. However, that world disappeared long ago. Once the South Korean economy took off in the 1960s the gap between the two Koreas grew ever wider. Two decades later democracy arrived, giving the ROK another advantage, while the end of the Cold War left the DPRK isolated from even its nominal allies.

With this dramatic change in circumstances, the two nations’ relationship should evolve as well. Instead, alliance advocates have come to treat the military relationship as an end, rather than a means to an end. Today this means attempting to turn a local security guarantee into something much larger around the globe. Of course, the two nations have shared interests and values, but most have nothing to do with the military. In contrast, Washington and Seoul have very different security priorities: the United States is much more concerned about terrorism, the Middle East, and North Africa. The ROK places a priority on good relations with China more than with other US allies, which fear China. There still is room for bilateral cooperation, but it could be organized ad hoc when circumstances dictated, not presumed by an alliance to be automatic. While the benefits of a “strategic alliance” would be limited, the costs of such a relationship would be high.

Every promise to go to war forces Washington to create corresponding military assets. Yet the US government is effectively broke and should not borrow money to provide military protection for a country that could provide for its own defense. Worse is the risk of war. At least in 1950 the Korean Peninsula seemed important for the global balance of power. Even if a new Korean war had an awful economic and humanitarian impact, there would be minimal effect on America’s security. A North Korean attack on the ROK would be just that, not the prelude to global conflict.

The alliance also interferes with US relations with China, which perceives, not unreasonably, the enduring US troop presence as an American-led effort at containment. The alliance also results in conflict with Pyongyang. Absent US military involvement on the peninsula, it would not need a North Korea policy. Even if the North eventually produced an accurate long-range missile, it still would be suicidal to attack the world’s premier military power. Pyongyang is focusing its ire on Washington only because of this involvement on the peninsula.

The alliance also is costly for the ROK, subjecting South Korean security to American control. After all, Seoul’s actions could trigger a war involving America. Washington understandably insists on consultations, if not veto power, over any military actions by the South. Decades ago American officials stopped the South’s nascent nuclear program. The United States currently limits the range of South Korean missiles. Washington has an agreement with the ROK preventing the latter from reprocessing spent nuclear fuel. Seoul voluntarily accepts these restrictions, even though, complained M.J. Chung at the Carnegie Nuclear Policy Conference in Washington on April 9, 2013, “telling us not to consider any nuclear option is tantamount to telling us to simply surrender.”

South Koreans also pay for America’s large-scale military presence. So-called host nation support covers 40-45 percent of America’s costs for stationing its troops. A Status of Forces Agreement limits ROK control over US military personnel, even those accused of committing a crime. Even the ROK’s policy toward North Korea is hostage to the alliance. The country with the most at stake obviously is the South. However, as Seoul’s big brother providing security, Washington is intent on influencing South Korean policy. After all, a mistake by Seoul could mean war for America.

The South cannot assume that the US guarantee is forever. Chung advocated that the ROK build its own nuclear weapons for this reason, “At a time of crisis, we are not 100 percent sure whether the Americans will cover us with its nuclear umbrella.” He is right. Whatever Washington’s present intentions, they could change. As Chung observed at Carnegie, “Korea always came as an afterthought for U.S. policy makers.”

Moreover, the growing attempt to give the alliance a regional or even global role threatens to entangle the ROK in more wars in which it has no interest. Worst would be conflict with China over Taiwan or various East Asian territorial disputes. Seoul already has sent troops to Vietnam, Afghanistan, and Iraq to help ensure Washington’s commitment. Finally, one of the most important impacts of the alliance, on both the United States and the South, is to enable and even encourage the ROK to try to appease the North. Seoul long has underfunded its defense, allowing the North to enjoy a quantitative, if not qualitative, military advantage. For a decade presidents Kim Dae-jung and Roh Moo-hyun followed the so-called Sunshine Policy, providing roughly USD10 billion worth of cash, food, and other aid to the North. South Korea continued to operate the Kaesong Industrial Complex even after the North sank a navy vessel and bombarded an island in 2010.

Should the alliance survive? While South Koreans’ desire for a cheap defense ride might override their desire to be treated as equals, the United States gains no comparable benefits for entangling itself in the Korean imbroglio. Seoul should take over responsibility for South Korea’s defense. Then the two countries could negotiate new, cooperative military arrangements as equals.

An alliance serves the military strategies of allied countries. When their grand strategies are in transformation, both their military strategies and the corresponding purposes of the alliance are subject to change. The Obama administration's East Asian strategy, as is well known, has undergone a fundamental change. The new strategic purposes are: to revitalize US hegemony; to reestablish a healthy financial foundation for renewed leadership; to rebalance national power under stress; and, for all these objectives, to highlight the importance of East Asia. Key elements of the rebalancing strategy include: strengthening alliances; building strategic relations with emerging powers, especially China; establishing a favorable multilateral environment, especially through the TPP; and emphasizing norm-based diplomacy. As for the ROK-US alliance, all these elements have an influence. The alliance is to be strengthened, while the two states seek a common strategic viewpoint regarding the rise of China, work together to encourage China to be a responsible part of a multilateral framework, and articulate an inclusive normative framework for a regional consensus.

After going through difficult times of alliance adjustment, South Korea is in the midst of articulating a new strategy. In the past, South Korea as a weak power could not help but care only about its own security and well-being. Expanding the strategic spectrum to both regional and global affairs is a recent phenomenon. As a member of the G20 and a host to the Nuclear Security Summit in 2012, South Korea slowly began to perceive itself as a player able to influence regional and even global affairs. If middle powers are considered to be countries that wield influence on strategic architectural issues at the regional and, to some degree, the global level, then South Korea is transforming itself into a middle power. As President Park Geun-hye mentioned in the press conference after the summit with President Obama in May 2013, South Korea tries to perform its role as a "co-architect" with the support of the United States.

When the new strategies of the two countries take clear shape, what will be the proper role for the ROK-US alliance? What can the alliance achieve beyond the narrowly defined purpose of deterring the North Korean military threat? How can the alliance contribute to future-oriented aims to smoothly manage the power shift in this region? Regarding these questions Choi Kang rightly addresses several crucial points: the countries need to share a common security threat perception; both have to redefine the alliance from a more comprehensive and normative perspective; both countries should address impending issues from the perspective of their respective, new grand strategies. All of this sounds reasonable in the abstract. Taking a closer look, we cannot avoid noticing that one important issue remains to be discussed: the rise of China and its regional impact.

As China continues to modernize its military, the United States has been closely watching with the intention of balancing. More than any other country, China is in the forefront of immediate, potentially high-intensity regional conflicts: the cross-strait conflict and possible standoffs in the South and East China Sea. Both South Korea and the United States do not want these conflicts to escalate into a military clash, not to speak of all-out war. The two countries will exhaust all diplomatic means to solve the problem. However, to avoid military conflict, both countries should pay attention to these tasks: to persuade China that the role of the ROK-US alliance is to contribute to regional stability, not to contain China; to spotlight the need for multilateral, military cooperation especially with a view to raising the level of military transparency; and to seek common missions for regional human security such as disaster relief, nuclear security, and peace-keeping. Such moves to cultivate the culture of military cooperation will test China and the alliance. They should be at the center in discussions of how to strengthen the alliance.