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My article in The Asan Forum on TPP has received a number of comments, including T.J. Pempel’s rejoinder and a vigorous debate on the Japan Forum LISTSERV sponsored by the National Bureau of Asian Research (NBR). There have also been developments in TPP negotiations and the US Trade Promotion Authority (TPA) debate that are relevant to my argument. I consider each of these in turn.

Starting with Pempel’s piece, I do not think I have any right to complain about a rejoinder that characterizes my analysis of TPP political economy as “masterful,” and indeed I think that Pempel and I are largely on the same page. That said, we do have some differences of interpretation that deserve further exploration. Pempel makes three main points:

1. The politics of TPP and of structural reform in general in Japan are more iffy than my article suggested.

2. The Abe administration’s support of TPP is intimately tied to its nationalist agenda, and its close embrace of both TPP and the US-Japan alliance is reducing its scope for successfully pursuing other potentially profitable trade deals with neighboring economies.

3. Some aspects of TPP, including restrictions on capital controls, are likely to have a negative impact on some participating economies, and these potential negative effects should not be dismissed lightly.

With regard to (1), I certainly agree that the politics of TPP will be difficult in Japan. As Pempel rightly notes, there are a number of powerful political groups that are opposed to key TPP provisions, some of them tightly tied to the conservative basis of Abe’s power base. While he agrees that using TPP as a lever to push through structural reform improves the odds of success, he argues that it is by no means assured. I am more optimistic about the odds of TPP approval by the Diet, as long as Abe’s own political position remains unassailable (I use this term advisedly, as I see no credible rivals within the LDP, at least for the moment). Obviously, this is a judgment call; so let me summarize my reasoning briefly.

First, I think that Abe, his administration, and his economic advisors are all deeply committed to structural reform, believing that it is essential for the rejuvenation of the Japanese economy and the success of their nationalist vision. Second, I believe that our categorization of opposing forces sometimes obscures the very real cracks within them. While analysts often write about Japanese agriculture as an opposing force, in fact the bulk of the opposition comes from the inefficient rice producers (who, admittedly, are the best organized) rather than from the much more competitive vegetable and fruit producers. Financial institutions are even harder to see as monolithic. Japan Post, a government corporation, would actually be the most disadvantaged by TPP passage, along with smaller banks. Japan’s major banks, insurance companies, securities houses, and fund managers, as well as more entrepreneurial smaller funds such as in private equity, would likely benefit from TPP—if for no other reason than it would restrain postal financial services. Pharmaceuticals is another industry with divided interests. I expect that Abe will be able to force TPP through the Diet; however, the longer the wait, the weaker Abe’s political position will become, allowing for either stalling tactics or outright internal opposition to have an effect. Unfortunately, for Abe, the timing of TPP will ultimately depend on the US Congress, which must pass TPA and TPP, both of which will likely take a long time if they happen at all. As I wrote on January 31 in the NBR Japan Forum, “the US is holding Japanese structural reform hostage and doesn’t really care.”

With regard to Pempel’s second point, I too am troubled that Abe’s reformist economic agenda is coupled with a kind of revisionist nationalism that generates frictions with China and South Korea. Combined with Abe’s other foreign policy initiatives, it is plausible that the focus on TPP will slow Japan’s formal economic cooperation with Asia. I am not convinced that this is happening, however. In a recent article, Mireya Solís and Saori Katada argue that negotiations on RCEP and the trilateral China-Japan-South Korea (CJK) FTA were actually accelerated by Japan’s announcement of its intention to join TPP¹. While that article may have been overtaken by events, it is hard to tell from published accounts; moreover, both the RCEP and CJK FTA negotiations seem to move in fits and starts, so it is hard to ascribe causes to specific delays. More recently, reports suggest that the long-stalled Australia-Japan FTA negotiations are moving forward again, perhaps spurred on by impatience on both sides with the slow progress of TPA in the United States.

Meanwhile, South Korea has publicly stated its desire to enter TPP, and even some Chinese economists have been calling for their government to give it another look. Of course, there is still ample opportunity for all of these initiatives to be derailed by domestic politics or international tensions over history or territory. As a political scientist, I have a secret desire (now revealed to the world) to see Japan try to jump-start RCEP as a means of getting the US Congress to debate TPA and USTR to pull back on some of its maximalist positions on capital controls, intellectual property rights (IPR), rules of origin (ROOs) for textiles, and investor-state dispute settlement. We will see if the Abe administration has the imagination to use that leverage.

With regard to Pempel’s third point, I am in full agreement. There are a number of US negotiating positions that strike me as problematic, whether because they are dangerous in and of themselves (such as the capital control provisions, as my colleague Kevin Gallagher has been arguing)¹ or because they would make the agreement politically unsustainable in many countries (such as the insistence on binding dispute settlement mechanisms for environment and labor commitments). I am aware of arguments to the effect that US positions on IPR are also problematic, but I am not well enough versed on the issue to have a firm opinion. I am hopeful that many of these positions will not survive the negotiating process, as none of the non-US TPP participants seem to support them (based on publicly-stated positions and various leaks). But Pempel is certainly right to warn us that the final TPP agreement, if it is in fact achieved, may create new problems as well as expand opportunities for trade and investment.

My article was also the subject of spirited discussion on the NBR Japan Forum. Several critiques were raised. Some participants were skeptical about the projections of the magnitude of economic gains that I used. I agree that it is unwise to put too much credence in specific numbers, as they are dependent on assumptions and future events. Still, the Petri, et al., estimates give us a rough sense of magnitude and of relative gains. Economic analysis shows very little aggregate benefit in terms of GDP for the United States but significant sectoral winners and losers, which explains the contentious congressional politics. For slow-growing Japan, the TPP is likely to create significant opportunities at the aggregate level as well as for “winning” sectors. Thus, even imperfect numbers are sufficient to make the political argument.

One writer dismissed the estimates altogether, attacking the notion of structural reform as being the key to better long-term Japanese growth. Rather, he argued, Japan’s problems are macroeconomic in nature and should be addressed through Keynesian demand management policies. I disagree with that position, for reasons that would take more than my allotted space to detail. (The short version is that there is good evidence that capital is inefficiently allocated in Japan, partly due to policies that allow for protection, self-protection, or overregulation.) In any event, the critique is not really relevant to the political argument I made, which only requires that the Abe administration believe that structural reform is necessary to improve long-term growth.

Several writers expressed concern about the possibility of US IPR rules being adopted more widely. One version echoed the concerns of critics in Australia and New Zealand, who fear that US pharmaceutical firms will be able to use TPP to prevent national health systems from purchasing less expensive generic drugs. Another critique worried equally about the effect of IPR rules on digital innovation. These may well be good reasons to oppose TPP, but for the moment I remain agnostic. One reason is that I lack expertise on IPR law and economics. The other is that I strongly suspect that the United States will be forced to compromise on some of its stronger positions. Because it is so contentious, IPR is going to be one of the last chapters to be finalized (and the final “landing zone” is very broad); so I think we really do not know what will actually be included in the final agreement

Finally, several writers expressed skepticism (as did Martin Frid in his comment on the Asan Forum webpage) that TPP could be completed at all, given the gaps between participants’ positions on key issues and the reluctance of congressional Democrats in the United States to support even TPA, let alone an actual trade agreement. I am not sure that TPP is “dead,” as one writer wrote, but I agree that congressional resistance to TPA and TPP will definitely make the negotiations harder to conclude and extend them considerably. As I concluded in my initial essay, the congressional politics of TPP “do not offer guarantees for a quick resolution.” Subsequent events, including Max Baucus’ departure from the Senate and Harry Reid’s stated opposition to TPA, only make that point more strongly.