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The mood in DC approached alarmism at the beginning of 2018. Following the Olympic Games in South Korea, not only was it assumed that North Korea would revert to provocative behavior, but Moon Jae-in was not trusted to apply more pressure, trying to sustain the rosy atmosphere that took shape in January. The Trump administration’s determination for a trade showdown was finally becoming manifest with many anticipating a trade war, centered first on China but embroiling South Korea too, as seen in the opening salvo in late January over its exports of washing machines. Perhaps, the biggest source of alarm was the assessment of how Trump had altered US foreign policy in his first year and what he was doing in early 2018 adding to the damage. In annual reviews and forecasts, there was awareness of US failures, Chinese successes, regional turmoil, and a lack of clarity about what moves can be expected to improve the situation.

In one review, panelists agreed that after the forty years of the Cold War, the United States lost its single organizing principle for foreign affairs—terrorism was not an adequate substitute— and Trump is compounding the damage by: undermining the US image of standing for ideals, coddling authoritarian rulers and those who oppose media freedom, and leaving past alliance commitments in a cloud. His low popularity abroad and the public’s loss of confidence in the US president have put America in retreat. Contradictions between what Trump tweets and what US officials say and official documents assert arouse a sense of chaos. Disdain for international institutions opens the door for China to forge alternative ones. It is harder for states to resist China when no US vision looms for them to embrace. The upshot of these developments and forces gathering steam in the Obama years is the fraying of the liberal international order, symbolized by the pullback from TPP by Trump, the loss of hope for ASEAN centrality, and the rise of populism skeptical of that order in many countries, including across much of Southeast Asia. Recent hopes for a new Indo-Pacific framework serve as an exception, raising the prospect of an ideological response to China and Russia’s envisioned regional order. Yet, as in the case of the high-sounding National Security Strategy issued in December, official words lack substantive back-up and are contradicted by actions of the president. Vague notions are no substitute for the Obama “pivot” with its important economic component, or for continued pushback in the South China Sea enabled by the near silence after the 2016 court ruling and then the failure by Trump to show US resolve there, leaving China to see it as a low priority for the United States and countries in the region.

Another concern about US policy raised in DC gatherings was a lack of alliance reassurance from the Trump administration. Some speakers called for more US trust of its allies: Abe’s pursuit of Putin should raise no serious concern since Japan is a reliable ally with no prospect of cutting a deal with Russia that would undercut US interests; and Moon’s testing of North Korea’s interest in dialogue should not be interpreted as contrary to US interests. More steadfastness and care in policy coordination is needed to convince Seoul and Tokyo that Washington trusts its allies. Yet, against the background of Trump rejecting Victor Cha as his nominee to be the ambassador in Seoul, there was fear that coordination would be sacrificed to impetuous, unilateral US moves. If no preventive war ensues, as so many in DC agree with Cha, there is still the question of what the alternative of a massive build-up of deterrence would be, particularly if Chinese cooperation continues to fall short. This would be THAAD on steroids, angering China and Russia and putting at much greater risk Moon’s efforts to satisfy Xi and Abe’s efforts to satisfy Putin. More active signs of US containment of China and Russia would likely also accompany this shift in approach to North Korea, in keeping with the new National Security and National Defense strategies. This polarization with a strong ideological component could pose a big risk to alliance partners in 2018, as Abe seeks to make this a year of improved Sino-Japanese relations without setting back Russo-Japanese ties and Moon is eager to build on overtures to Beijing and Moscow in the last months of 2017. Alliance divergence on key security issues appears to be growing worse.

At a DC panel on East Asian security there was a sense that Trump’s visit to Asia reassured all sides that there was no fundamental change in US policy despite Trump’s rhetoric at times and lingering doubts about impending troubles. The Trump-Xi meeting did not suggest a G2; Trump in Seoul did not sound bellicose; trade conflicts were left to be handled later; and Xi already had avoided setting a timetable for unification with Taiwan. China draws most attention with a complex foreign policy of more assertive hard power and more active soft power. This is seen in policies toward Taiwan: frequent patrols, fake news, pressure on those who go to the PRC, and a “cold peace” with quiet cooperation but no official dialogue. Talk of military action here has quieted in favor of “peaceful unification,” bolstered by additional moves to entice people through economic ties. Meanwhile, Chinese confidence has grown that it will have full control over the East China Sea and is succeeding in diplomacy tied to the South China Sea as its military build-up continues. After visiting China, Trump stressed his “Indo-Pacific” framework, leaving many, including in China, wondering about its meaning apart from the focus on India. One observer compared it to BRICS, an idea that precedes figuring out what states have in common with both concepts floundering over an unreliable India. The National Security Strategy devotes some space to the “indo-Pacific” strategy, but vagueness prevails. Loss of TPP and the “rebalance” leaves China winning in Southeast Asia with no clear US commitment to the region, i.e., a self-inflicted wound or “own goal.” This assessment early in 2018 set the tone for more pessimistic interpretations as further developments occurred.

Russia in Asia

Russia draws attention in DC for its aggressive foreign policy, including its mixed signals on North Korea. At one session the focus was put on Russia’s quest for status, including through its own sphere of influence and other attributes of a superpower emeritus. This includes respect for the historical achievements of Russia and the Soviet Union and insistence that there is no unipolar world, where Washington can dictate terms and belittle Russia’s status. The fact that the National Security Strategy of the United States mentions Russia as many as 25 times is seen as proof of its high status—Russia is taken seriously. Russia’s hunt for status in Asia also serves its overall quest, but listeners were told that its quest is unsustainable. China gives Russia status with its deference on security in Central Asia, but it does not support spheres of influence in Asia, whether Russia in Central Asia or India in South Asia. Maneuvering for a voice on the North Korea question—to the point many in Russia are okay with the North possessing a nuclear deterrent—does not suffice to give Russia the illusion it really has a big role to play, while if this were to lead Japan and South Korea to join the nuclear club, Russia’s status would be diminished by this club becoming less exclusive. Aspirations for status are tied to Russia’s fundamental decision by the end of the 1990s to redefine itself, the core of its national identity, as the successor to the Soviet Union in foreign policy. There was not much optimism expressed about Russian foreign policy or Russia-US relations given this analysis.

In another discussion on Eurasian integration skepticism was raised about BRI as a mercantilist and geopolitical challenge, but it was recognized as the most compelling, if vague, vision of integration with the effect of marginalizing the United States. Not only is it after five years the most steadfast of proposals, China has the foreign reserves and excess capacity to make it look viable. Yet, Xi’s intention of forging a community of common destiny has implications for sinocentrism and deference to Chinese preeminence that keeps countries on edge as they wait rather suspiciously for what is to come. Debt traps arouse suspicion that China is seeking to build its military bases in return for unrepayable loans. Other designs for Eurasian integration are peripheral, as the SCO is now mired in irreconcilable antagonisms, e.g, between India and Pakistan, and the EEU is a rearguard operation with meager potential. Russia is driven by two fallacies: its military power gives it a considerable leverage to be a great Asian power when it lacks demographic, infrastructure, expert, and diplomatic assets to realize that aim; and its hopes remain centered on using its tilt toward China to regain leverage in the West. Kazakhstan is intent on separating spheres, keeping political and military ties focused on Russia while expanding economic ties with China, plus drawing know-how from the West without provoking Russia in the manner of Ukraine—a delicate balancing act dependent on Nazarbayev and vulnerable to China’s growing clout. Yet, fears of China abound for national identity to the point of opposing property ownership by the Chinese, unlike the US welcome to Chinese ownership. Claims to be able to manage China and to achieve multipolarity ring increasingly false but are required as policy justification.

Another exchange was gloomy about the prospects for a breakthrough between Abe and Putin despite recent Japanese hopes that Putin provides the strong leadership needed and a weaker Russian economy makes a deal more likely. The number one problem is the Northern Territories in Japanese view, but the consensus in DC is that Putin is very unlikely to yield on the return of any islands. So where does that leave Abe’s trust-building crusade with its 20 summits over 5 years? It was convenient for Japanese to excuse the meager results of talks in 2014-15 as a side effect of bad Russo-US relations over Ukraine. Yet, DC respondents wondered, how could the past 15 months of unrealized hopes—after a half year of mounting expectations in Japan—be reconciled with any optimism today? Is not the obvious message now that Putin has no interest in a deal over the islands and has decided to focus on trying to drive a wedge between Tokyo and Washington, leaving Abe no choice but to stick with Japan’s ally and boost missile defense in response to an increasingly threatening environment? In addition to security, history more than before is standing in the way, as Putin has glorified 1945 as the sacrosanct cornerstone of national identity, allowing no room for a deal that would sacrifice fruits from that victory.

A number of themes arose in the discussion of Japan-Russia relations, which can clarify the situation. “Vassal Japan” is how Russians refer to Japan’s deference to Washington, as if it is not an independent, sovereign state. Only by defying Washington, not just in conducting summits that angered Obama but on matters of sanctions and defense, could Japan hope to escape this label. “Aged islanders” refers to Abe’s impatience to strike a deal, reminiscent of the
South Korean quest for honor for the “comfort women” before the last surviving victim dies. This gives Putin the sense that Abe is desperate and will keep making concessions. “Pivot to Asia” as well as “multipolarity” are what Japan cites as driving Russia to make a deal, but respondents downgraded their significance due to: 1) Putin’s view that his success with China is the top achievement in foreign policy since he took office in 2000, and his determination not to endanger that, making the pivot China-centered and multipolarity in Asia a secondary matter; and 2) the conclusion that Japan does not have much to offer, as seen in the measly contents of Abe’s “8-point plan,” and that Japan’s business community has scant interest in what Russia has to offer, despite the few METI figures whom Abe has enlisted to champion big projects. Another theme is “Aegis Ashore,” which Japan has decided to deploy, infuriating the Russians, who do not take Japan’s defense needs seriously, as if they are just concessions to the US containment strategy of China and Russia. One additional theme is the “Russia card,” eyeing improved Russo-Japanese relations as a means to weaken China and Sino-Russian relations, but this logic ignores the far greater importance of the “China card” for Russia versus the United States and exaggerates Japan’s geopolitical importance. As long as Xi is hostile to the US alliance system in Asia, including the US-Japan alliance, this complements Putin’s hostility to the same system and even his greater revisionism versus the existing US-led order. Perhaps, Russia will awaken to national interests that raise Japan’s value and lead to improved US ties, but as long as strengthening “Putinism” is the focus of national identity, Japan’s prospects are grim.

Further discussion of Japan-Russia relations provided more explanations. In its more assertive military presence around Japan, Russia is helping China pressure Japan, not, as some argue, really aiming at China. In substituting for China in meeting some of North Korea’s needs, it is also working against Japan, which Japanese are reluctant to criticize and some Chinese even see as a reason to complain. One viewpoint is that Japan has a bad balance of power in Asia and is approaching Russia from desperation, perhaps accounting for Japan’s tenaciousness despite the poor return from its overtures. Another comment in DC is that Japan is making 2018 the year of China, suggesting that despite the hopes raised about Putin taking action after his reelection Abe puts little stock in that prospect. Discussion proceeded to the question of why Abe and the pro-Abe media in Japan has kept a façade of optimism about Japan-Russia relations with little honesty and what has been occurring. Is it a “hail Mary” attempt to ward off an even closer Sino-Russian relationship, perhaps cognizant of some new frustrations on the Russian side since the high hopes of 2014-15? Or is it a way for Abe, as Japan becomes ever more dependent on the United States, to create an image of an independent foreign policy?

The Korean Peninsula