Chinese views of South Korean history

On August 3, Beijing ribao depicted THAAD as not aimed at defending against North Korea, but rather splitting China from South Korea.1 On August 7, Huanqiu shibao depicted the visit of Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong to Washington as Singapore joining in the US containment of China.2 China is rapidly adopting a polarized view of Asia—a realist, balance of power approach on the surface, but actually an identity-led worldview consistent with the legacy of communism and rebirth of sinocentrism. In this dichotomy, history figures prominently, as witnessed by Chinese treatment of South Korea’s history. According to China, South Korea is ignoring its own economic and security interests due to unresolved historical issues. In fact, however, it is China that has set aside its own economic and security interests in favor of a “China Dream” rooted in its own history.3 Chinese writings about South Korean history clearly reveal this mindset.

The framing of international relations in China is steeped in history. Leaders repeatedly play the “history card” against Japan, a legacy of Jiang Zemin, who, when visiting Pearl Harbor in 1997, conveyed the message that Japan was the common enemy of China and the United States. Japanese media charge that Xi Jinping has only doubled down on this approach, intensifying his warnings of the revival of Japanese militarism.4

Barack Obama’s late May visit to Hiroshima rekindled concern in Japan of China’s rejection of future-oriented relations, as Chinese officials insisted that Nanjing massacre be remembered and refused to consider Japan as a victim of the war.5 If Obama’s Hiroshima stop has imperiled China’s efforts to split the United States and Japan over history, the Japan-ROK “comfort women” agreement five months earlier was yet another failure to maintain the divisions between South Korea and Japan over history. China’s strategy to isolate Japan reached its peak under Park Geun-hye in 2013-15, distracting attention from China’s own attempts at historical revisionism against South Korea. South Koreans were preoccupied with China’s overtures to forge a united front against Japan, and paid little attention to Chinese distortions.

In the South China Sea territorial disputes, Chinese insist that international law takes a back seat to “historical” rights. In the East China Sea dispute and other themes related to Japan, the shadow of history continues to resurface in Chinese arguments. The Korean Peninsula is no exception to the logic that permeates Chinese writings on “surrounding areas.” In 2004, Koreans awakened to how Chinese publications were treating Koguryo, raising disturbing questions about the perceived historical boundaries of China and its right to intervene in peninsular affairs. In 2010, prior to assuming China’s top post, Xi Jinping praised the “great” Korean War, making clear that the history of Sino-DPRK relations can be invoked in considering China’s role in current peninsular rivalries.6 Attention to Korean history was broadening and intensifying around that time.

In 2012, I examined the way history was being used by Chinese in Sino-ROK relations.7 Here, I update the coverage, focusing again on the Chinese thinking, while linking it to Chinese policy toward the peninsula under Xi Jinping, particularly since early 2016.

The idea that history does not matter was widely articulated in the 1990s and remained popular even through 2015. In normalizing its relations with South Korea, China was assumed to be acting pragmatically, not ideologically, seeking both economic benefits (which was beyond its wildest expectations) and stability. It also anticipated diplomatic benefits, which occurred under Kim Dae-jung, Roh Moo-hyun, and even Park Geun-hye. China even pursued civilizational benefits, capitalizing on the demonization of Japan’s historical revisionism and simultaneously, Seoul’s hesitation about joining in US efforts to promote universal rights in a manner that would directly target China. In reviewing about two decades of Sino-ROK relations, Jae-ho Chung accentuates how both Seoul and Beijing were under the influence of realism and liberalism.8 The image of Chinese pragmatism, however, did not last beyond 2016.

Chinese Narratives on South Korea Prior to the Xi-Park Era

The 2009 book by Wang Xiaolin on how Chinese view South Korea warned of strong emotions rooted in cultural divides with historical overtones, raising concerns that appear quite removed from central themes of the Chinese narrative today. Emotions were so raw that Wang entitled a concluding section, “Do Chinese Hate Korea?” His answer was “no” in light of the “Korean wave” and economic ties, as well as some 50 percent of the respondents to a recent survey saying that relations are “good” and 67 percent saying that they have a better attitude toward South Korea than Japan.

Yet, Wang paid close attention to an emotional undercurrent of cultural distrust to explain some deterioration in relations between the two peoples: Korea had stolen China’s cultural heritage; a South Korean TV station had prematurely broadcast the opening ceremonies of the Beijing Olympics; and some Chinese netizens even called Korea the country they hate the most. The “detest Korea emotions” (xianhan ganqing), which spread from 2007, was not aided by the Chinese government.9

Missing from his analysis, however, is any mention of censorship and Chinese leadership’s determination to prevent any enthusiasm over the “Korean model.” This included any fascination with South Korea that could interfere with China’s support for North Korea, any human rights pressure on North Korea that could lead to a “color revolution,” and any appreciation of the “Korean wave” at odds with sinocentrism. Before security issues had risen to center stage, the Chinese people had found themselves in a cultural/historical battle with South Koreans. The Koguryo dispute had been but one early manifestation of it.10

In 2009-12, Chinese writings on South Korea and the history of the Korean nation had turned more negative. President Lee Myung-bak’s policies were regarded as a reversal of the improved China-ROK relations achieved under President Roh Moo-hyun. This was put in a historical context, reaching back to earlier periods in Korean history.11

In 2013, the advent of Park Geun-hye’s administration, marked by her wooing of Xi Jinping in what has been called a “honeymoon” of Sino-ROK relations, quieted concerns in some circles, as Chinese pressed to solidify a historical consensus against Japan. However, the so-called “China Dream” national identity narratives accelerated under Xi’s ideological leadership, intensifying pressure for “historical correctness.” At the same time, Park’s lack of deference to China’s foreign policy and worldview became obvious. As discontent grew, historical references appeared widely in Chinese writings about South Korea, the contents of which are presented below, followed by a discussion on how they are relevant to China’s current foreign policy.

Views of Korean History to the End of the Cold War

As the poster case for China’s tribute system, China expected Korea to express gratitude for its good fortune, to be situated next to a benevolent neighbor who, unlike those in the West, did not wish conquer or implant its religious and other values on Korea. This came to matter more to Chinese as they glorified their own history at the center of a “harmonious world,” and brought history to the forefront in “neighboring relations” not only with Japan, but with the entire Asian community. Ingratitude lay at the core of their criticisms.

The Koguryo dispute rekindled a topic deemed uplifting for Sino-ROK ties: premodern history. Koreans in the 1990s were proud of their Confucian roots, even labeling their nation the most Confucian today and anticipating China to celebrate their shared cultural traditions and close historical bonds.12 In Chinese sources, reminders of historical closeness were, as such, common. All of this changed not only because of the Koguryo controversy, but also because Chinese insisted on reconstructing Confucianism as consistent with communism, unique to one nation rather than a regional inheritance that for decades bridged different social systems in Asia. According to their view on nearly 2000 years of history, Koreans should be grateful for receiving China’s superior culture and enjoying its harmonious order.

Wang Mingxing, recalling the war of 1894-95 on its 120th anniversary, offered insights into Chinese thinking about Korean history.13 The Jiawu year arrives once every 60 years: in 1894, an apocalypse occurred leaving Korea in the clutches of Japan; in 1954, talks failed to resolve the disastrous division of the peninsula. Wang argued therefore that danger lurks in 2014, which must be avoided. Putting current developments in historical perspective, Wang sees Korea as a strategic point, where the Western powers target Northeast Asia for carving up the world, where continental and maritime arenas meet, and where the great power interests clash.

In the 1890s, some Koreans made a tragic mistake in trying to pit the great powers against each other, naively counting on Japan. With China in retreat, Korea was left at the mercy of competing powers threatening its independence. In the 1950s, hopes for unification were dashed as the Koreas were embroiled in the Cold War. The United States was blamed for opposing Korean independence, as it did in 1910, and the peninsula became the frontline of the Cold War. While China withdrew is troops, US troops remained, helping Seoul block unification. As for 2014, blame is again placed on the United States, for using the pretext of North Korean nuclear weapons to contain China, and on Japan, for enabling its right wing to reemerge. In these circumstances, Seoul has to choose between repeating the mistakes of the past and siding with Japan over China or seizing the opportunity for unification and a new national voice. In short, rejecting China and its support, along with North Korea, for unification, is the source of tragedy on the peninsula, which Japan and the Western powers have caused.

Jiang Xiuyu wrote a companion piece on the Jiawu war emphasizing change in the East Asian regional order.14 The war disrupted Chinese society and enabled Japan to enter the ranks of the imperialist, capitalist powers. It ended the sinocentric order and began a new triangular Sino-Korean-Japanese pattern. Jiang assumes a natural order centered on China versus an imperialist, rapacious order imposed by Japan. Korea appears as a venue for competition among great powers, and its relations with China suffered due to Japan and other great powers.

Shi Jianguo on the 70th anniversary of the victory over Japan wrote about Sino-ROK cooperation on historical memory. Shi described their joint efforts against Japan as having far-reaching significance even today. Arguing that the Japanese government is trying to deny history and return to the path of militarism, Shi insists that not forgetting history is important for the development of Sino-ROK relations and Northeast Asian peace. Their histories not only were parallel, but intertwined—the Korean independence forces gathered in Chinese cities, their nations’ destinies became intertwined, and longstanding friendship and cultural closeness drew their nations (minzu) ever closer. These forces led the Chinese people to assist the Korean independence struggle, and, after 1931, the Korean independence movement to help China’s fight against Japan.15 Ignoring the US defeat of Japan in liberating Korea and the distinctions between North and South Korea, Shi gives the impression that South Koreans should feel indebted to China for its role in what appears to be the most important event in their history—removal of Japanese occupation. While emphasis is placed on this formative era for postwar relations, the author leaves unsaid that this favors Pyongyang, not Seoul.

Emphasizing the role of the Chinese Communist Party and the Korean independence movement, Shi feigns an embrace of the Korean people while actually postulating the case for closer relations with the North Koreans. Just as the history of the 1930s-40s has been accentuated at the expense of later history in Sino-Japanese relations, it serves as a touchstone for Sino-ROK ties. In communist tradition, the anti-fascist struggle (now transposed into an anti-hegemonic and anti-militarist struggle) takes precedence over other themes of bilateral relations. Koreans, it follows, should focus on this period too and be grateful to China’s assistance. Shi points to their common destiny, history of mutual support, need to oppose Japanese revisionism, as well as need to counter Korean distortions of history.

Japanese colonial rule—when China and Korea were both victimized, struggling for liberation—is prioritized in historical narratives. China’s emphasis on the heroic rise of the Chinese communists and battle against the evil Japanese echoes in the coverage of Korean history, hinting at the superior pedigree of North Korea and the dark stain of Korean collaborators with Japan who morphed into the elite of South Korea. This narrative may have slipped from sight in the 1990s but it still informs writings. It can be invoked whenever bilateral relations seem troubled.

Views of South Korean History During and After the Cold War

During the Cold War, Seoul, imbued with anti-communist thinking, was blamed more than Pyongyang for its failure to improve relations. The Cold War context serves as a blanket explanation for trouble on the peninsula without any effort to take notice of North Korean belligerence.16 The Korean Peninsula is treated, then and later, as just a natural arena of competition between great powers; Korea has little capacity to affect its own destiny. In this deductive approach, China’s logic about a shift from bipolarity to multipolarity supplants attention to North Korean threats—indeed, the North appears as a malleable actor ready to become a pragmatic partner if South Korea and the United States could abandon their Cold War mentality. The burden today remains for Seoul to accept China’s position that the real problem is the US alliance system that denies the transition into multipolarity. For a time it appeared that normalization in 1992 would serve as a decisive dividing line, which now seems mistaken since the United States and Japan did not recognize North Korea, while South Korea’s actions toward the North remain in a Cold War mode.

Chinese harsh treatment of South Korean policies began in 1992 and was most pronounced in 2009-11, according to a review of Chinese publications.17 They view South Korea as “delusional” about North Korea, “vulnerable” to China and North Korea, and under sway of the relics of “Cold War” in relations with East and West. Even if the tone had shifted somewhat during the Park-Xi “honeymoon,” this thinking still prevailed.

Views of South Korea under Park

In late 2013, Liu Qun reviewed 20 years of normalized relations, identifying obstacles to further improvement, while repeating the mantra that no fundamental differences or contradictions exist and that the next 20 years have bright prospects.18 Not only are they found in economics (the two economies are highly complementary and enjoy a huge space for further cooperation on a regional level), but also their common interest in promoting peace and stability on the peninsula. For both economics and security, stress is placed on excluding the interference of external factors.

Such remarks are put in historical context. Readers learn that because of their 2000-year-old history, China understands Korea and the two nations have a strong, shared cultural foundation. However, they also learn that after 40-plus years of separation, they hold misunderstandings and nationalist sentiments that serve against sincere cooperation. Liu argues that despite a few thousand years of historical contact and acceptance of Confucianism in Korea, values and worldviews are different due to decades of separation. He cites how this impacts their views of “refugees” from North Korea, which the South treats as a human rights issue, and the “Northeast Project,” a political issue.

Liu, of course, makes all of his demands “one-sided,” never indicating any shift in China that would be helpful. First and foremost, Seoul must remove the greatest barrier to their relations, the outside interference. It must accept China as a bridge between itself and the North, implying that relations will be judged on whether Seoul deals with Pyongyang by improving ties regardless of Pyongyang’s behavior. Warning that we cannot blind ourselves to deficiencies in relations, Liu calls on South Korea to look out for what is needed. Optimism in Seoul about Park-Xi relations was left in doubt in this article.

“Trustpolitik” and the “honeymoon” with China were interpreted in Chinese writings as a mixture of a return to Roh Moo-hyun’s balancing toward China (in particular, concerning peninsular affairs), and a replacement of deterrence with unconditional “trust” in diplomacy with North Korea. If Japanese publications had a tendency in 2013-15 to present Park’s policies as no less than an historic turning point, so too did some Chinese publications from the very onset of her tenure in office.19 Yet, they keep putting pressure on Seoul to go much further.

In 2015, Chinese writings depicted South Korea as at a crossroads, highlighting two key themes: 1) handling Sino-Japanese relations in the context of a dispute rooted in history but extending to security and territorial issues; and 2) balancing Sino-US relations in the context of South Korea’s reliance on the United States, which shifted slightly under Roh but remained unable to find equilibrium.. In historical terms, Seoul’s dependency on Washington is deemed a product of the Cold War era, which is not consistent with Seoul’s national interests today.

Wang Xiaobo and Wang Yushan wrote that Seoul is facing unprecedented challenges in maintaining its dual-track approach, relying on Washington for security and Beijing for economyt. They imply that the time for a zero-sum choice has arrived.20 Tang Yanlin and Bi Dabo at the same time optimistically anticipated new breakthroughs in Sino-ROK relations, balancing the ROK’s ties with Beijing and Washington. They suggested that Park has already made the choice of abandoning heavy reliance on Washington, putting this in the context of the development of Sino-ROK ties since the time of bilateral normalization.21

As Japan-ROK relations improved, Zhan Debin warned of new challenges to China.22 The fact that Park had linked history questions to security cooperation is praised, but the impact on political ties was greater than on security ties, and the history linkage remained limited to “comfort women.” Zhan finds that Park could not be trusted on history; at first, she stood strong in 2013-14, but in the second part of 2015, she shifted to separate history and security, to emphasize cooperation and accept the US push for trilateral security. Zhan argues that Abe’s August 14 statement did not meet Korean demands, but Park turned to the future, contrary to the wishes of many Koreans. Clearly, Chinese disappointment on her handling of relations with Japan revealed the salience of historical issues in their relationship, indicating that security must not be considered in isolation.

Comments on Park’s betrayal on the history issue with Japan indicated that Beijing and Seoul had very different objectives in mind when they found common ground in 2013-15. For Xi, it was a matter not so much of responding to Abe’s extremism, but making Japan a pariah and putting history at the center of thinking about foreign policy—an approach that also applies to Korean affairs. For Park, it was a response to Abe and, one can surmise, an effort to win Xi’s trust in order to increase cooperation on North Korea. After the December 28 Japan-ROK agreement, China could be sure that it had lost the battle over history. Washington, which had found Abe’s approach in 2015 satisfactory and put pressure on Park, defeated Beijing, which had rejected Abe’s approach. China stressed the overlapping effects of the war on September 2, on the independence of Korea on October 1, and in various NGO meetings on “comfort women.” By stirring a sense of shared historical memory, Chinese had hoped that they could weaken the US-ROK alliance, taking advantage of spillover from Japan-ROK divisions. By 2016, they realized that the historical divide is too wide.

In Chinese writings, the United States is the aggressor, disrupting the status quo and using its satellites, the Philippines and South Korea, to contain China. Unless the THAAD decision is reversed through China’s counter-measures toward South Korea, China will suffer a great strategic loss.23 In Jiefang Junbao on August 5 claimed the THAAD decision as destroying the regional strategic equilibrium and stability in line with the continuous post-Cold War US attempts to sustain its hegemony. Seoul was the weak link in the US-Japan-ROK triangle. It had capitulated, as Washington used anxiety over the North Korean nuclear and missile tests as a pretext for strengthened trilateral security cooperation. Park Geun-hye, as Lee before her, took a hard line toward North Korea, leading Seoul to tilt toward Washington, which it had not done under presidents Kim Dae-jung and Roh Moo-hyun. Giving no credit to Pyongyang or even Seoul, the article implied that it is Beijing and Washington who will decide the future of the peninsula. Seoul simply decided that over the next 10-20 years, the US position would be stronger.

The article also asserted that Park’s October 2015 visit to the White House was the turning point, not the North’s January 2016 nuclear test. The July THAAD decision was timed after the court decision on the South China Sea and attention once again turned southward.24 Yet, Chinese sources hinted that this might backfire for Seoul: 1) Japan will be emboldened by THAAD and Seoul’s new direction to turn further to the right: 2) the conservative officials who have pushed for THAAD deployment may alienate Korean society; and 3) a heavy price may be paid in Sino-ROK relations.

THAAD is one more provocation, worsening the standoff with North Korea, as it pushes Beijing and Moscow closer and deepens polarization. After being portrayed as the leader who forged the best ever relations with China, Park is now warned about being seen as an historical criminal (lishi zuiren).25 One can surmise that the problem is not THAAD itself but the refusal to side with Beijing at a time when Beijing is intent on polarization.

Similarly, on August 4, Guangming ribao made the case that the THAAD decision would backfire. The Korean people would realize that Park has put them in the crosshairs of geopolitical rivalry, and they would pay a heavy price economically. They have lost the goodwill of the Chinese people, can no longer expect “middle power” relevance, NAPCI is gone, the Eurasia initiative is gone, and hopes over the past two decades for salience are shattered. Moreover, the goal of reunification has been set back. Responding much more negatively to South Korea’s decision to defend itself than to North Korea’s actions over the past 20-some years, Chinese sources insist that a red line has been crossed in the Sino-ROK relationship, posing danger to Seoul and all of its regional aspirations.26 What this suggests is that China’s policy has been to split Seoul and Washington all along, and now that this has failed, it has no more use for Seoul—unless the Korean people adjust its policy toward Pyongyang accordingly.

In a review of Park’s late spring visit to African countries and France, a Chinese article saw it as part of a doomed strategy to mobilize international community’s pressure on North Korea, rather than pursuing “peaceful coexistence” (as preferred by Kim Dae-jung and Roh Moo-hyun.)27 Little doubt was left that China would oppose Park’s moves. More than THAAD destroying the “honeymoon,” Park’s response to the nuclear test in defiance of China and its strategy matters. After the THAAD decision, Park was accused of breaking the regional balance of power, but her real transgression was defying historical judgments central to Chinese thinking: sinocentrism and the Cold War salience of North Korea. They insist that Seoul should build trust with North Korea, ignoring its nuclear program, and change its thinking about the United States.28 It must accept North Korea’s “core interests,” not the other way around. Further, Seoul must recognize that it and Washington caused the North Korean nuclear crisis and are now making it worse. To solve it, they need to reassure North Korea and deal with great power relations in a new manner. They need a different assessment of the Cold War and the post-Cold War period. These are the clear implications of Chinese publications.29

Chinese analysts start from three assumptions: 1) the Korean Peninsula can only reduce tensions and achieve reunification if South Korea as well as the United States normalize relations with North Korea and accept a non-aligned status for the peninsula; 2) South Korea must reconsider its outlook on democracy, human rights, and the history of communism to stop rejecting Chinese ways of thinking; and 3) the entire history of the East and East versus West is at stake as South Koreans consider their place in the emerging world. Diplomatic means such as the “Six-Party Talks” are the only way to peacefully solve the nuclear dispute and instill “stability” in the region, and therefore must take precedence for Seoul to change its policy on Pyongyang and Beijing.


Three overriding historical judgments shape Chinese writings on South Korea: 1) the Cold War has not ended due to US mentality, which targets China along with Russia and renders the Korean Peninsula on the front lines of great power competition; 2) the natural order in Asia is sinocentric, China has shown to Korea that it could be trusted, and nothing China has done suggests that it should not be trusted again; and 3) the history of national liberation and revolution proved that China was a victim itself as well as a support to other victims, and Koreans should still oppose Japan—intent on glorifying and reviving its role— in solidarity with China.

Deflecting its responsibility for Seoul’s distrust, Chinese sources have little choice but to locate the cause in Korean history and psychology. Just as Soviet interpretations of China’s rejection of the Soviet order in the early 1970s found its explanation in distortions of Chinese history,30 Chinese writings have looked to aspects of Korean history for their answers and found much that deserves criticism.

Chinese authors demand South Korea to have a correct view of history without clarifying the limits of what they may require. Mid-2010s saw a correct understanding of Japan’s history, not only its imperialist aggression (for which Chinese find little to fault South Koreans) but also its legacy for today’s resurgent militarism. Other themes include the South Korean view of China’s premodern history of sinocentrism and the tribute system; and the view of the Cold War, including the Korean War. Japan serves to drive a wedge between Seoul and Washington, as Beijing insists on linking visits to the Yasukuni Shrine to the passing of collective self-defense laws. The tribute system is associated with calls for exclusive Asian regionalism, forcing a choice between ties to Washington and Beijing. Finally, the Korean War cannot be divorced from Chinese thinking about how to manage North Korea, insisting on a regional framework that undermines the US-ROK alliance as if it is the principal barrier to final resolution of the nuclear crisis.

Chinese have chosen the following labels for South Korean behavior: “unification through absorption,” “westernization,” and “containment.” Korean attitudes toward China are “ungrateful,” show “Cold War mentality,” and reflect “psychological” problems. Chinese writings have turned from cautiously embracing Park Geun-hye to harshly condemning her. This is in line with the “hate Korea” arousal of 2007-09 and the tendency to demonize South Korea in 2009-12. China’s dichotomized view of history leaves little room for a “middle power.”   

1. Beijing Ribao, August 3, 2016

2. Huanqiu Ribao, August 7, 2016.

3. Gilbert Rozman, The Sino-Russian Challenge to the World Order: National Identities, Bilateral Relations, and East vs. West in the 2010s (Woodrow Wilson Center Press and Stanford University Press, 2014).

4. Sankei Shimbun, May 28, 2016, 1.

5. Yomiuri Shimbun, May 27, 2016, 7.

6. “China Commemorates 60th Anniversary of Participation in the Korean War,” October 25, 2010,

7. Gilbert Rozman, “History as an Arena of Sino-Korean Conflict and the Role of the United States,” Asian Perspective 36, no. 2 (Spring 2012): 287-308.

8. Jae-ho Chung, Between Ally and Partner: Korea-China Relations and the United States (New York: Columbia University Press, 2007).

9. Wang Xiaolin, Zhongguoren xinmuzhong de Hanguoren xingxiang (Beijing: Minzu chubanshe, 2009), 463.

10. Gilbert Rozman, ed., U.S. Leadership, History, and Bilateral Relations in Northeast Asia (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011).

11. Gilbert Rozman, ed., National Identities and Bilateral Relations: Widening Gaps in East Asia and Chinese Demonization of the United States (Washington DC and Stanford, CA: Woodrow Wilson Center Press and Stanford University Press, 2013).

12. Gilbert Rozman, “Can Confucianism Survive in an Age of Universalism and Globalization?” Pacific Affairs 75, no. 1 (Spring 2002): 11-37

13. Wang Mingxing, “Jiawuqishilu: Chaoxian bandao pian,” Dangdai Hanguo, no. 4, 2014, 1-12.

14. Jiang Xiuyu, “Zhongri Jiawu zhanzheng yu Dongbeiya guoji guanxi de bianhua,” Dangdai Hanguo, no. 4, 2014, 13-21.

15. Shi Jianguo, “Zhonghan hezuo kangri de lishi huigu he xianshi yiyi: jinian kangri zhanzheng shengli 70 zhounian,” Dangdai Hanguo, no. 2, 2015, 114-22

16. Wang Feiyi, “Guoji tixi bianqian yu zhanhou Hanguo zhengzhi fazhan,” Dangdai Hanguo, no. 1, 2013, 66-74.

17. Gilbert Rozman, “History as an Arena of Sino-Korean Conflict.”

18. Liu Qun, “Zhonghan guanxi: ershi nian de huigu yu zhanwang,” Dangdai Hanguo, no. 4, 2013, 9-17.

19. Wei Zhijiang, “Shilun Hanguo Park Geun-hye zhengfu de waijiao zhengce quxiang yu Chaoxian bandao jushi,” Dangdai Hanguo, no. 1, 2013, 12-22.

20. Wang Xiaobo and Wang Yuxuan, “Zhonghan guanxi ‘yuejinshi” fazhan yu Hanguo waijiao mianlin de zhanlue jueze,” Dangdai Hanguo, no. 4, 2015, 35-45.

21. Tang Yanlin and Bi Dabo, “Zhonghan guanxi xin tedian fenxi,”Dangdai Hanguo, no. 4, 2015, 27-33.

22. Zhan Debin, “Hanguo duiri anquan hezuo: dongxiang, dongin, yu taozhan,” Riben Yanjiu, no. 1, 2016, 18 -31.

23. Beijing Ribao, August 3, 2016.

24. Jiefang Junbao, August 5, 2016.

25. Guangming Ribao, August 4, 2016.

26. Guangming Ribao, August 2, 2016.

27. “Park Geun-hye xixing: xiayiban daqi?” Shijie zhishi, no. 13, 2016, 32-33.

28. Bi Yingda, “Chaohe wexie ‘changtaihua’ xiade Chaohan guanxi kunjing yu chulu,” Dangdai Shijie yu Shehuizhuyi, no. 3, 2016, 161-67.

29. Fan Jishe, “Chaohe wenti chonggu: jiangju de genyuan yu yingxiang,” Waijiao Pinglun, no. 4, 2016, 35-58.

30. Gilbert Rozman, “Soviet Reinterpretations of Chinese Social History," Journal of Asian Studies (November 1974): 49-72. Republished without permission as "Criticisms of Soviet Revisionists’ Distortions of China’s Social History," Waiguo Yanjiu Zhongguo, no. 3, 1979, 75-117.